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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000723

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SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 27 MARCH 2005

REF: A. (A) TD-314/11841-05

[1](#)B. (B) SANAA 00557

Classified By: RSO Tim Laas for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d).

[1](#)1. (S/NF) Summary: CDA Nabeel Khoury, convened an EAC meeting on March 27, 2005, to discuss a litany of recent security concerns to include security at the hotels in Aden, recent threats from Yemen citizens who have lost family members in Iraq, as well as a review of general security concerns in light of U.S. development and military assistance in country. Additionally, para. 4 delineates a meeting between hotel management and the RSO. EAC meeting key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: DCM, LEGATT, RMAS, POLE, OMC, and RSO. End Summary.

[1](#)2. (S/NF) RMAS briefed EAC members about security concerns regarding the Sheraton Hotel in Aden. RMAS noted that a cell previously thought to be targeting the Aden Hotel had in fact turned out to be planning a mass casualty attack on Aden,s Sheraton Hotel. Although previous RMAS reporting documents the fact that host nation, Republic of Yemen (ROYG) security forces interdicted the cell conducting pre-attack planning, RMAS explained to the EAC that it is possible that remnants of the terrorist cell could be reconstituted to resume pre-attack planning. Based on the non-specific but potential threat that may exist in Aden, EAC members recommended that the DCM and RSO take action to improve security at the Sheraton in particular and to hotels frequented by the western community in general, immediately.

[1](#)3. (S/NF) EAC discussed the findings of a hotel security survey conducted by FPD of the Sheraton Hotel in Aden. Based on RMAS threat reporting, the EAC recommended immediate action to first provide a positive 24 hours, 7 days a week stand-off at the Sheraton. The DCM instructed the RSO to immediately contact Sheraton Hotel management in Aden to request action. The EAC agreed that if no constructive measures were taken to improve security within the next three days at the Sheraton Hotel, the Embassy should inform the American community through a Warden Message about ongoing security concerns related to the Sheraton Hotel and Aden.

[1](#)4. (S/NF) RSO met with Sanaa Sheraton Hotel manager, Tony Gubran, at the Sanaa Sheraton at 1230 hours on 28 March 2005. Tony is acting manager of the Sheraton Hotel in Aden, during the interim until a new manager arrives. RSO provided Tony a general threat briefing regarding Embassy concerns about the Sheraton Hotel in Aden. Tony asked RSO to travel with him, on or about April 3, 2005, to Aden to provide the owner and him guidance for setting up the security of the hotel,s physical plant; RSO agreed. Following the briefing, Tony immediately contacted the owner and Sheraton headquarters and advised them of the potential risk of a serious incident at the Sheraton Hotel, if hotel management did not take immediate action to improve perimeter security. Tony then contacted personnel at the Sheraton Hotel in Aden and instructed them to begin immediately:

- Restricting car parking: No cars allowed to park closer than 25 feet.
 - To use an existing drop barrier to slow incoming vehicles.
 - To register all vehicle plate numbers entering the Sheraton property.
 - Screening vehicles specifically looking for large packages.
 - To check car trunks.
 - Screening trucks and receiving area deliveries.
 - Posting two Group 4 contract guards at the Beach.
 - Ensuring the beach remains well illuminated.
 - Placing all security personnel on high alert.
 - Requesting Yemen authorities to post additional armed sentries on the perimeter
- (Tony asked the RSO to conduct liaison on Sheraton,s behalf).

15. (SBU) The OMC also advised the EAC about an individual in the Yemeni Coast Guard, in Aden, who lost a son in Iraq due to Coalition Forces security operations. The angry father believes his son went to Iraq as a Mujahadeen to fight Coalition Forces and was subsequently killed. According to the American Embassy OMC source in Aden, the father, a Coast Guard Officer named Major Abd-Rabu or Abd al-Rabu, made general threats against Americans. RSO informed EAC members that he provided the name of the angry father and circumstances of the threats to the MOI on March 26, 2005, with a written request to intervene. OMC stated that he had received word on March 27, 2005, that in fact Yemen Coast Guard/MOI officials had taken action to prevent the Yemen Officer from striking out at Americans. RSO awaits confirmation from MOI as to what specific action they have taken to interdict a potential attack against Americans by the man or the man's family members and associates. RSO placed the threatening person's name in the Visa Viper system.

16. (S/NF) EAC members also discussed a second case reported by RMAS REFTEL, involving a threat that was made against the Ambassador and Westerners in general, by a father disgruntled because he believes his son was being detained in Iraq by Coalition Forces. RSO informed the EAC that he presented information regarding the threatening person's name to MOI. RMAS and RSO reported no verification of intervention by local authorities regarding the threat. RSO placed the threatening person's name in the Visa Viper system.

17. (C/NF) At the request of the RSO the Charge advised the EAC that an expanded EAC would be held to look at the overall threat environment in respect to current operational tempo, especially continued growth in travel and exposure brought about by development activity, i.e. USAID expansion and large military assistance programs and training that create clusters of 30 people or more in soft-target hotels and buildings.

18. (SBU) One EAC member asked the committee to consider her perception that the post danger pay differential was too low when compared to the threat and to other posts with similar risk profiles. The DCM agreed to ask the Management Office for guidance.

19. (SBU) EAC members inquired of RSO as to DS/IP/FPO's response to previous concerns regarding cuts in static residential guard services as noted reftel B. RSO advised EAC that he would conduct appropriate inquiries.
Khoury